This is the second chapter in my MA thesis on Privatization of Public Space.
The bibliography is included in the complete paper.
This document is approximately 4000 words and may be downloaded.
Frederique Krupa
Spring 1993
Battery Park City:
Luring Back The Upper-Middle Class
Situated on the southern tip of Manhattan, just minutes from Wall Street, Battery Park City has become a paradigm for mixed-use urban renewal developments. When it is finally complete at the end of the decade, over 14,000 housing units and six million square feet of office and commercial space will have been constructed on the 92-acre landfill site.1 Excavations for the World Trade Center, part of the 1960's downtown construction boom, contributed 25 acres, creating low-cost land for the city on top of decaying Hudson River piers. The Port Authority also saved money by not having to transport and dispose of the excavated material. The rest of the fill was dredged up from the bottom of New York harbor. The creation of this new land cost the state $200 million.2 In the late 1960's, Mayor John Lindsay and Governor Nelson Rockefeller, both proponents of large public works projects, found themselves with prime, undeveloped real estate. From its inception, Battery Park City was viewed as a money-making venture, a residential haven for the downtown professionals who might otherwise choose to live in New Jersey or Westchester. New York like many other cities was feeling the effects of the national trend of suburbanization, encouraged by federal policies such as mortgage tax credits and extensive highway construction. A concerted effort was needed to bring professionals and their social service-paying tax dollars back to the urban center.
While Battery Park City went through several design stages, one concept never changed: the middle-class would not come back the city unless they were assured of a secure high standard of living. In other words, the middle class would not put up with the social problems of the disenfranchised. Therefore, the state believed that the development should remain exclusive. This way it would provide not only an increased tax base but also contribute money to finance low-income housing elsewhere. Conveniently, this elsewhere happened to be in Harlem and the Bronx, where it was argued that housing money would go further in rehabilitating abandoned buildings than constructing new units. Another justification was that if there were subsidized housing in Battery Park City, there would be fewer market rate housing, limiting the revenues generated by a more affluent population.3
While new construction costs more than rehab, the rejection of real mixed-income housing is an unfortunate reflection on current housing policy. Battery Park City has grown into an exclusive community while housing for the poor has been limited to only the most undesirable, crime-plagued locations. Ultimately, the question is not whether the housing in Battery Park City is good or bad, it is a question of who should have access to good quality housing and a nicely maintained neighborhood. Is it appropriate for the city spend its limited land and financial resources on a small privileged segment of the population already well served in the New York housing market? Is it really necessary to build the low income housing outside of Battery Park City? Or has the final conclusion -- isolated communities that once limited the integration of the underprivileged with the rest of the city -- become an ideal development?
...
In 1962, the 20 collapsing Hudson piers lead the New York City Department of Marine and Aviation to propose reconstructing a 100-acre-truck dock to lure the shipping industry back to New York. They hired consultants to create a revitalization plan that would map out the area's development potential until the year 2000. The consultants suggested quite a different scenario, an exclusive Miesian development built on top of the terminals.4 Ever since the 1600's, they argued, the development pattern for lower Manhattan has continually expanded out into the harbor, and this was the natural way to develop. The plan's mix of shipping and housing was not warmly received, but building over the piers appealed to Governor Rockefeller, since this was a way of creating a large number of new housing units without destroying an established neighborhood. With Robert Moses's Lincoln Center project and Penn Station's destruction still fresh in the minds of many New Yorkers, the ill-effects of urban renewal were being hotly contested, and community groups were organizing themselves against intrusive "slum clearance" projects devised by various government agencies.5 Another Battery Park City plan was devised by Wallace K. Harrison in 1966 at the instigation of the governor, but Harrison's modernist towers in the park were not well received either because its uninspired design was quickly losing popularity.
At the same time, Mayor Lindsay also proposed a plan designed by Conklin and Rossant, and a battle between opposing forces ensued. With Charles Urdstat at the helm, the state created the Battery Park City Authority (BPCA) in 1968 to have a bonding authority of its own -- separate from the financial status of the municipal government -- to finance its projects.6 Philip Johnson was brought in to mediate between warring factions of government, and the first official 1969 master plan was issued by the BPCA board composed of Conklin, Rossant and David Wallace. Although homelessness was nowhere near as prevalent as it is today, the resulting design created an enclave for the rich with more architectural innovations than social ones. One noteworthy element of the 1969 plan was raising the elevation of Battery Park City's ground plane to the level of the World Trade Center, covering the West Side Highway. A precursor to the failed Westway project,7 this would have helped Battery Park City integrate with the rest of the urban fabric.
The city retained rights to the land under the river, thereby controlling the planning rights of the landfill via the City Planning Commission. It was impossible for the BPCA to do anything without first consulting City Planning. The hostile nature between City Planning and the state agencies resulted in a 105-page charter that took nearly five years to complete. By this time, the local real estate market was glutted, with 30 million square feet of unleased commercial space available in downtown alone.8 In 1974, on the eve of the city's fiscal crisis, the BPCA bonds failed to sell, and the project was put on hold. Financed by the state with $200 million in "moral-obligation" bonds that did not require voter approval, the landfill was the only part of the project advancing. But, with its complicated infrastructure requirements, the landfill was not finished until 1977.
With the disappointing progress of Battery Park City in 1979, Governor Hugh Carey altered the BPCA's 3-person board of directors by adding two able executive officers of the New York State Urban Development Corporation (UDC), William Hassett, chairman and David Kahan, president. The UDC had the power to cut through bureaucratic red tape like local zoning ordinance and basic democracy that make construction so difficult in the city.9 So the BPCA became part of the UDC. David Kahan brought in the New York firm of Cooper Eckstut to redesign a more attractive master plan, making the project more salable. Under pressure from BPCA's impending default on the $200 million state bonds, Stan Eckstut produced a new master plan in less than 90 days to get the state legislature's approval. To make the plan feasible, Eckstut attempted to make Battery Park City more attractive to investment and more responsive to current urban planning approaches. Formally, he integrated Battery Park City into the city by aligning the site with the existing downtown street grid. He also emulated desirable neighborhoods like Gramercy Park and Central Park West. A gentle veneer of diversity, controlled through materials, setbacks, curb cuts, color schemes and lobby entrance guidelines, created an instant nostalgia for New York's kinder, gentler past. Diversity was encouraged by allowing private developers to develop smaller parcels incrementally rather than having the city or the state build it all themselves. Since creating luxury housing with public money was not a very popular selling point, the project was devised to generate a profit that would finance the low and moderate income elsewhere. Incorporating nearly all of the Cooper Eckstut report, the Battery Park City plan was approved by Governor Carey, Mayor Ed Koch and Kahan in 1979.
Part of the plan called for the New York City to relinquish its ownership of the land by letting the UDC condemn it. The city would exchange all its planning and financial controls for one dollar. The city would also receive all future profits and tax-equivalency payments and regain ownership of the land once BPCA bonds and state advances were repaid. This structure allowed BPCA to capture its own revenue stream for the administration and maintenance of the project. BPCA promised the city $400 million in bonds secured by the revenue for affordable housing and $1 billion in excess revenue put into the general fund by the end of this century. BPCA leases parcels of land out to developers who then construct and own their buildings. Building and condominium owners do not pay property taxes; instead, they are charged "payments in lieu of taxes" tabulated by the BPCA based on the city tax rates. The BPCA then pays the city whatever profit is left after all maintenance and administrative costs and debt service have been met. In 1991 alone, BPCA generated a $37 million PILOT check for the city.10
...
If New York is to remain the center of the global marketplace, it has to attract the headquarters of multinational corporations and the educated and professional workers that work for them, which Robert Reich calls "the symbolic analysts."11 Battery Park City can be seen as a prototypical development for these symbolic analysts with their high paying jobs. While 75% of the units in Battery Park City are studios and 1 bedrooms which reflect the expected residency of two-income childless couples, rent for studios range between $850-$1200, one bedrooms average $1500 and two bedrooms average $2400. Condominiums range from $98,000 to $1.1 million. The residents must also pay additional "civic facilities payments," $200 for a condo owner and $50 for a renter, for full time security and ground maintenance staff.12
Currently, Battery Park City contains a resident population of 7,500 and a working population of 25,000 spread over 23 buildings. Begun in 1981, the commercial core is the grandly named World Financial Center, made up of four postmodern reflective-glass and thermal-granite towers and the glass-enclosed, barrel-vaulted Winter Garden, a 3.5 acre public plaza and luxury shopping mall. The project was awarded to the Canadian megadeveloper Olympia & York, who financed, built and currently owns the $2 billion project. Cesar Pelli won the limited competition to design it. Merrill Lynch moved into two of the towers, leasing 60% of the 6 million square foot complex. American Express and DOW Jones took the majority of the other two towers. Outside the Winter Garden is a large plaza with art installations by Scott Burton and Siah Armajani and a marina for 26 yachts at least 80 to 150 feet long.13 Berths can be leased for a minimum of seven years at a cost of $1.5 million; this comes to roughly $200,000 a year or $600 a day. 30% of Battery Park City is set aside for open space, including the plazas, parks and 1.2 mile waterfront esplanade.14
The southern residential sector is made up of three clusters that were developed over nearly two decades. The oldest -- the only "pod" built from the 1969 plan -- is Gateway Plaza (1980), finally finished in 1983 with 1712 housing units in three 34-story buildings and three 8-story buildings on a 5-acre site. They are considered the "project" of the development because of their brutal modernist design.15 To the south, Rector Place contains 2,200 units in 12 building that follow the design guidelines of the Cooper Eckstut plan.16 Six separate developers hired their own prominent architects such as Charles Moore, Davis, Brody & Associates and Stewart Polshek & Partners. Begun in 1984, Rector Place and the one-acre Rector Park were all ready by 1987. On the southern tip, the incomplete Battery Place contains 2,800 units in three buildings,17 each created by a separate development team. Battery Place will be the location for the Museum of Jewish Heritage though financial difficulty has put that project on hold. Battery Park City will perhaps be connected to Battery Park, much to the chagrin of the Battery Park City Owners Association, by extending the esplanade through South Park. They fear the "...derelicts, all the homeless, all the undesirable-all the problems of Battery Park.." would wind up in their park.18 "We don't want hawkers selling counterfeit watches and T-shirts," stated BPC Owners Association President Marie Crouch. Although this is a public park, they feel that since they pay a maintenance fee to the Battery Park City Parks Corporation, they have the right to decide what happens to the park. The controversial 3-acre $12 million park is set to begin construction in 1994.19
To the north of the World Financial Center, the infrastructure for the residential sector is still being built and ideas are still being kicked around. The zoning and mapping, completed in 1987, lead the BPCA and the Board of Education to open a new Stuyvesant High School in 1992, financed and built by BPCA at a cost of $150 million and maintained by the Board of Education.20 Once located near Stuyvesant Park, the school's enrollment is based on entrance exams and is widely considered one of the best public schools in the nation. A special $6 million bridge had to be constructed for the 3,000 students who would have to cross the dangerous West Side Highway.21 In addition, the $16 million, 8-acre waterfront Hudson River Park opened in June of 1992 after three years of construction.22 Meanwhile, New York's economic downturn has lead the BPCA to construct two baseball fields on the rest of the undeveloped lots until the development prospects improve. A proposal to create 100 affordable units -- for families making $40-50,000 -- in a 300 unit building with larger 3 bedroom apartments caused such an outcry from the Battery Park City Owners Association. Fearing falling property values if the community lost its exclusivity, the plan has been progressing very slowly.23 Apparently, middle-class renters have an easier time. A Moderate Housing Initiative tax-abatement program is available for Battery Park City's rental buildings if they subsidize 20% of the apartments for moderate income tenants. This deal is great for landlords at times when the luxury housing market is soft. Generally, the participating tenants are young college-educated full-time employees making $27-32, 000 a year.23B
The $4 billion development, mostly financed by private capital, has since generated substantial returns for the city. The $200 million state-provided seed money for Battery Park City was completely repaid with interest by 1987.24 The government now expected the BPCA to generate revenues. In 1986, Mayor Koch announced his $4.2 billion, ten year housing plan to generate 250,000 affordable housing units for New Yorkers.25 Battery Park City was meant to play an integral part in funding this undertaking. Since the BPCA had a separate credit rating from the city, much better in fact, it could use its blue-chip rating to issue bonds on behalf of the city that would in turn be used to create low and moderate income housing on city-owned land. The Housing New York Program was developed under the auspices of the New York City Housing Development Corporation to oversee bond issues backed by the BPCA.26 Recently, however, Olympia & York's bankruptcy has affected the BPCA's bond rating and has forced it out of the lucrative short-term bond market.26A
...
Though the fiscal crisis of the mid-1970's was precipitated by a combination of mismanagement and withdrawal of federal subsidies, the city also lost 300,000 manufacturing jobs, 800,000 residents and experienced drastic abandonment of properties from landlords who could no longer generate profit to meet their tax obligations.27 Landlords frequently set fire to their buildings in order to collect the last bit of profit from the fire insurance before abandoning the buildings to the city. The city of New York found itself in possession of huge swaths of land in the Bronx, Harlem and the Lower East Side. Most of the housing that came into the city's possession were deteriorated, abandoned tenement shells. (The problem became so bad that many fire insurance companies refused to cover properties in New York City, until the state's Insurance Regulatory Commission finally stepped in.)
The New York State Municipal Assistance Corporation -- an association of banks that have helped finance the city's debts for major profit -- and the Emergency Financial Control Board -- comprised of the governor, mayor, comptroller and 3 corporate executives that oversaw the rest of the city's financial affairs, including all labor contracts -- restructured the city's finances under the assumption that free market forces can allocate money more efficiently than government agencies.28 During this time, the Urban Development Corporation was established to override local land-use ordinances and to bring in private sector investment.29 Privatizing public services, controlled under local jurisdictions, would use city tax revenues more efficiently and streamline the municipal government. Wealthy communities such as Business Improvement Districts (BID) and the Upper East Side, now pay for the maintenance of their own neighborhoods. Poor jurisdictions have correspondingly suffered, as they are less likely to be able to afford private street cleaning or private security when faced with more pressing social problems like drugs and crime. Gaps in educational spending are even more drastic; wealthier neighborhoods spend twice as much on the average per student and teacher's salary than their less fortunate neighbors.30 The city's privatization and financial restructuring benefited New York's private sector and banks but did little for its social agenda.
Though Battery Park City was intended to provide apartments at the upper end of the spectrum so that less expensive apartments would become available, the trickle down theory did not pan out. The trickle-down theory of economics broadened the gap between the rich and poor. As William Tabb explained,"this effort to bring back the world of laissez-faire, in which social responsibility is reduced to private charity...is not unique to New York City: on the contrary, the shift to neoconservative reprivatization that is proceeding rapidly under the Reagan administration is...merely the New York scenario writ large."31
...
Of the $400 million in bonds promised by the BPCA in 1987, only $210 million have been sold by Housing New York, established as a subsidiary of the New York City Housing Development Corporation to oversee the bonds issued by BPCA for affordable housing. From this money, 1620 affordable housing units have been rehabilitated in the Bronx and Harlem. Scatter site housing rehabilitates individual abandoned buildings in a defined area rather than entire blocks. Most of the Bronx housing is located between 1415-1585 Townsend Avenue and 1424-1635 Walton Avenue. In Harlem, the housing is located between Lenox Avenue and Adam Clayton Powell Boulevard from 139th to 144th Street. Of these units, 30% are reserved for homeless and doubled-up families ($0-5,000 a year), 40% for very low income ($5-10,000), 20% for low income ($10-15,000) and 10% for moderate income ($15-25,000).32
The renovated housing stock in Harlem consists of handsome six-story apartment buildings, with clean facades, new windows, secure entryways and wheelchair ramps. Harlem is blessed by well-constructed, generously-proportioned apartment buildings, originally built for white bourgeois families that could afford better housing. After the Civil War, poor blacks from the south moved to New York City, and Harlem experienced a drastic white-flight in the late-19th century. Due to segregation, African-Americans had limited housing opportunities and were limited to residing in certain neighborhoods, even if less expensive housing was available in white neighborhoods. Homes and apartment buildings were often subdivided to accommodate the increasing population. In the 1920's, Harlem enjoyed a thriving cultural scene and growing black middle-class.
Now, the majority of Harlem's businesses seem to consist of check cashing places, liquor stores and bodegas. Still one of the poorest communities in New York City -- only certain sections of the Bronx are poorer --- Harlem now appears as unintegrated as the Jim Crowe days. While the citywide median household income is $30,000, the median household income in Central Harlem is $13,000, and 23.3% of the households report incomes of less than $5000 a year.33B Within a mile from the Upper East Side (with the city's highest per capita income), an imaginary boundary line exists at 95th Street where in a few short blocks the faces on the street go from black to white. Battery Park City's median household income, on the other hand, was estimated at $110,000.33C
Unfortunately, new housing is not the only thing needed to rebuild these neighborhoods. All the money provided for low-income housing might ultimately serve no benefit, because -- although money is made available for construction -- the economic and social conditions that generated these slums are left unattended.33 The segregation of income only serves to reinforce the nature of the slums even as it generates money for low-income housing. Without access and proximity to a prospering middle class, these neighborhoods will not be able to support legitimate businesses and generate enough revenue to become self-sustaining. By economically and socially polarizing these neighborhoods even further, Battery Park City becomes more of an enclave for the well-to-do (with ever more restrictive rulings demanded by the BPC Owner's Association, to be sure), and the slum of Harlem and the Bronx become harder to turn into viable communities.
...
The Battery Park City redesign is arguably more successful than the proposed modernist super-blocks because it has successfully simulated diversity and integration. Rather than being diverse through generations of building codes, styles, materials and construction techniques, the buildings still have a homogenous brand-new feel to them. In reality, buildings underneath the skin are really no different from overscaled modern high-rises. Considering the expensive rents, the apartments are surprisingly average and ungenerous in space.
For all the talk of integrating Battery Park City into the urban fabric, it has continued to offer only limited access and relative isolation. Ironically, its failure to integrate has come to be seen as a bonus by its residents. Its stern public face, seen from downtown only hints at the splendid parks and esplanade beyond the lawns protected by chain link-fences and the massive World Financial Center. While the rest of the city is plagued by homelessness resulting from loss of affordable housing in the boom economy as well as the clearing of state psychiatric institutions, Battery Park City has remained relatively free of the homeless -- though the streets, parks and esplanade are all technically public. The reason might lie in the restrictive access available to pedestrians. Only three roads lead into the two-mile long development. Over the West Side Highway, the 22-second crossing signal restricts those impeded by old age or shopping carts.
The current pedestrian entrances are via two covered bridges, each 200 feet long and 40 feet wide, called North and South Bridge. South Bridge connects the appropriately named South Gatehouse to an unmarked structure on the sidewalk of Liberty Street and is closed in the evening and on weekends. North Bridge connects the World Trade Center and the Customs House to the World Financial Center and Winter Garden via a maze of climate controlled corridors and revolving doors. Once in the Winter Garden, one is presented with the enormous barrel-vaulted, palm-treed interior complete with a lavish marble and granite semi-circular staircase. Allowing public access to the Winter Garden is perceived as a privilege and a great "public amenity."
Aligning Battery Park City's main entrances through the World Financial Center is an interesting statement on our society's prerogative concerning the global financial world. By entering through the World Trade Center --hopefully avoiding the overcrowded and boisterous low-end shopping arcade and transportation node -- one is lead along a concourse with rows of television monitors declaring future events at the Winter Garden. (Polka bands, Third World music or the occasional classical recital, perhaps?) These uncontroversial public art programs are organized by BPCA and are considered charitable to the public realm.34 As they often require local participation to some degree, these programs are a gesture of goodwill on the part of the sponsoring multinational corporations such as tenants of the World Financial Center that do not have any real loyalty to one location.
At the end of the tube, revolving doors control the stream of executives and secretaries going in and out of the World Financial Center. Having finally arrived at the Winter Garden, one can shop at the luxury boutiques that sell a wide variety of first-class, international merchandise. By limiting the ease of access, the chances of having undesirable wander in is also limited. The large security staff, dressed in inconspicuous navy blue blazers but sporting 2-way radios, are spread throughout the World Financial Center. The homeless and the underprivileged are made to feel like outcasts in a society of achievers.35
Should this not be sufficient to safeguard Battery Park City, the doormen and the staff that clean and maintain the parks pretty much cover the rest. Battery Park City's Parks Corporation collect maintenance fees from the residents to assure that the parks remain spotless. The recently completed $18 million Hudson River Park has a maintenance budget of $1 million a year.36 Traditional public parks, littered with broken glass, already understaffed and facing budget cuts, should be so lucky. Such notions only reinforce the belief in the superiority of the private sector. As for security, the doormen are paid for keeping undesirables out of the buildings. On the street, private security (which employs 2.6% of the American workforce) patrols the neighborhood 24-hours a day.37 Curiously, these services are rendered mostly by young minority males. By buying the services that guarantee a measure of cleanliness and security, the symbolic analysts pay for the improvement of their own situation and those of other resident symbolic analysts. The rest of the city, in turn, is left behind.
...
While Battery Park City's mechanism for financial growth is very impressive, isolating the poor, in many regards the most vulnerable members of society, in drug and crime ridden communities helps to reinforce a cycle of poverty. It is also a convenient way to keep them out of sight. Perhaps integrating a wider mix of income levels in Battery Park City, serving fewer families if necessary, might serve a working-poor family better than giving them a new apartment in a desolate war zone. Correspondingly, the poor neighborhoods could also use a few more middle income residents to boost the commercial opportunities of a larger segment of the city, rather than in just a few privileged communities. Privatization of public services and local financial control foster development patterns that are so uneven in New York City that small focused segments thrive while the rest of the city is left to fend for itself.
While Battery Park City may provide a safe, clean community that is popular amongst the upper-middle class, the repercussions of denying the pressing needs of the rest of the city is even more dangerous. Already, Battery Park City is hailed as a model community to bring back the urgently needed upper-middle class to the urban center. What this type of plan ignores is the need of a well-designed environment for everyone. By blessing this type of development for the public realm, we reinforce an illusion of public space. In reality, we turn our backs on the rest of the city and reinforce the idea that it is okay to just look out for our own demographic group. The public realm is not just for a small segment of the population; it is for the entire city. By allowing the symbolic analysts to ignore their social obligations for the more charming private realm, we aggravate a social problem that will not go away by itself.
Chapter 2 Endnotes
1. Battery Park City Authority literature.
2. Lu Ratunil, "After Years of Being Down;" Manhattan Spirit, April 7, 1993.
3. Abraham Biderman, Commissioner of HPD, in a Letter to the Editor, New York Observer on Feb. 13, 1989.
4. Part of the Lower Manhattan Plan, from Battery Park City Authority press literature.
5. Robert Caro, The Powerbroker: Robert Moses and the Fall of New York; New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1974.
6. Brendan Gill, "The Skyline," The New Yorker, Aug. 20, 1990.
7. Michael McCauliff, "Green Grass, Red Tape," Downtown Express.
8. Gill, ibid.
9. The statement about the UDC existing to overcome basic democracy is by David Kahan.
10. Glenn Thrush, "Battery Park City 2000," Downtown Express, July 27, 1992.
11. Symbolic Analysts solve, identify and broker "problems" and are the successful segment in the global marketplace. The Inperson Server and the Routine Producer, which makes up 80% of the population, are in fact getting poorer. Robert Reich, Work of Nations, pg. 268-282.
12. Lauren Ramsby, "Quiet Enclave on the Edge of Manhattan," New York Observer, Sept., 20, 1993.
13.Chris Oliver, "Megabuck Marina," New York Post, March 22,1989.
14. Figures for this paragraph come the Battery Park City Authority literature.
15. Gateway plaza plaza is constantly derided in articles that deal with the planning of the residential sector. See Gill, ibid. and Greg Sargent, "White Collar Colony," Downtown Express, Dec. 7, 1992.
16. These guidelines include using Caledonia granite for the curbs and seating walls, Belgian block cobble strips, fences of wrought iron pickets with cast iron spears and bluestone walkways. Rector Park design statement from Battery Park City Authority literature.
17. Figures for this paragraph come the Battery Park City Authority literature.
18. Jere Hester, "Not in My Garden," Downtown Express, Dec. 9, 1991.
19. Another controversy over South Park was Jennifer Bartlett's attitude toward designing something impractical and terribly expensive. The commission for the park was finally taken off their hands after Governor Cuomo decided it should be redesigned from scratch. See Herbert Muschamp, "Sprucing Up the Site," New York Times, Jan. 7, 1993.
20. Emil, David; New York Times Editorial; March 28, 1992.
21. Karrie Jacobs, "Little Utopias", Metropolis, Sept. 1992, pg. 86.
22. See Alison Simko' "Hudson River Park Opens," Downtown Express, May 25, 1992 and Karrie Jacobs, ibid., pg. 86.
23. Terry Golway, "Irked in BPC by Affordable Housing," New York Observer, March 29, 1993, pg. A1.
23B. Interview with a Moderate Housing Initiative tenant.
24. Cover page of the Battery Park City Authority 1987/88 Annual Report.
25 Gill, ibid. and Battery Park City Authority 1987/88 Annual Report.
26. See the Battery Park City Authority 1987/88 Annual Report and Thrush, ibid.
26A. Thrush, ibid.
27. See Jack Newfield, City for Sale, New York, Perennial Library, 1989.
28. William Tabb The Long Default, New York, Monthly Review Press, 1982, pg, 1-21.
29. Tabb, ibid., pg. 21-31.
30. Reich, Work of Nations, pg. 268-274.
31. Tabb, ibid., pg. 15.
32. Figures obtained from Mary McConnel at Housing New York.
33. Camillo Jose Vergara photographed the gradual degeneration and abandonment of hundreds of buildings in slums over several years to show the futility of Koch's Housing Initiative, from "The New Urban Landscape," a show at the Storefront for Art and Architecture in the fall of 1991.
33B. 1990 Census figures in New York City Department of City Planning, Socioeconomic Profiles,March 1993.
33C. From Jerry Chelsow, "A New Neighborhood Along The Hudson," New York Times, Dec. 26, 1993, Real Estate, Pg. 3
34. Anita Contini, who runs the art programs for the Winter Garden, was once part of Creative Time, a non-profit organization known controversial art in the public realm. From Hannah Morris's case study.
35. M. Christine Boyer, "City of Illusion," Design Book Review, Winter 1992.
36. Jacobs, ibid., pg. 86.
37. Reich, ibid.,pg. 269.
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